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The literature on globalisation often argues that territorial borders are increasingly losing 
their importance for OECD member states. Some authors have even proclaimed the 
end of the territorial nation state and therefore of traditional forms of border control 
and identity checks. According to a thesis that has become prominent in the debate 
about globalisation, the primacy of the global economy has transformed states into lesser 
subjects of a »transnational liberalism« that will in the long run result in the dissolution 
of jurisdictional spaces hitherto characteristic of the nation state. Catchwords such as 
»vanishing borders«,2 »virtual state«3 and »borderless world«4 have thus gained wide-
spread acceptance within this context. Other theses, by contrast, predict a renaissance 
of the strong state. In the face of newly emerging global threats states are, according to 
them, showing strong interest in maintaining their control competence to the point that 
it becomes possible to speak of »rebordering«.5 Despite possible gains from the »global 
market-place«, which might induce states to dismantle borders, the maintenance of se-
curity has remained a central motive of the state’s legitimacy, leading nation states to 
reinforce their borders and border controls.
Less prominent theses about the long-term transformation of national borders tend to 
describe these changes in a more differentiated way. They, too, subscribe to a change 
in the role of territorial borders for the state, but the borders’ lesser role is seen as less 
pronounced and limited to certain fields of the state’s competence. In this perspective, 
change both affects the configuration of borders and results in the creation of functional 
equivalents of national borders and their control. National borders thus become more 
open but, at the same time, an increased selection takes place regarding various categories 
of persons wishing to enter the state’s territory. This transformation of borders includes 
reinforced international cooperation and an increased delegation of border functions to 
supranational (or macro-territorial) entities. In addition, we assume that borders and 









1 | Steffen Mau, Sonja Wrobel, Jan Hendrik Kamlage, Till Kathmann Nützenadel
The present article will focus on changes in the regulation and control of cross-border 
movements of persons by the state. The first part will provide an overview of the exist-
ing literature on the relationship between borders, identity checks, and the state within 
the historical context of nation-building. The second part will then describe changes in 
the cross-border movements of persons and resources, as well as in border regimes and 
identity checks with reference to empirical studies. Its starting point will be the ques-
tion whether and to what extent cross-border movements of persons and resources have 
increased in recent decades. The analysis will show that the number of crossings varies 
strongly according to various factors and types of cross-border movements, as well as 
the state’s control of these cross-border transactions. Furthermore, the transformation of 
borders will be outlined with reference to changes in their operative organisation and the 
shaping of border regimes. Recent empirical developments indicate that states increas-
ingly conceive of the control of their borders as bilateral and multilateral issues to be 
dealt with through international cooperation or within the framework of supranational 
entities. To this must be added a distinct technological change in security and control 
systems for border surveillance. The new model of border control and its corresponding 
surveillance regime can be described as follows: state borders are to be shaped in the form 
of semi-permeable filters that allow for a differentiated control of some people while si-
multaneously ensuring greater openness for others. In the last part of the article, we will 
synthesise the results of our literature review. We will argue that the transformation of 
borders and the state’s capacity to control them should not merely be evaluated on the 
basis of increasing cross-border mobility, as has often been done. This transformation 
should rather be contextualised and therefore be part of an integrative approach that 
takes into account the operational and institutional level of borders, i. e. their concrete 
organisation and the shaping of policy fields relevant to them.
2. Nation state, territoriality and state borders
Historically speaking, the paradigm of a nation state acting sovereignly within and out-
side its borders and exercising the sole legitimate political rule within a defined territory 
in a quasi-anarchical environment has long been the predominant model of political 
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considerable historical and empirical influence but also dominated scientific-analytic 
conceptions.9 In this perspective, the nation state as an ideal-type is based on the congru-
ence of three elements: as a space of domination that unites a nation and state authority 
within a given territory.10 From the point of view of international law, the nation state 
was the single sovereign subject of international relations, which claimed exclusive ter-
ritorial sovereignty and the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence in its internal 
and external relations.11 The historical premise for this exclusive role was the emergence 
of territorial rule and a sovereign nation, as well as the state’s penetration of almost every 
sphere of life.12 
The modern nation state whose democratically legitimised authority is concentrated 
within a given territory, came into existence with the French Revolution at the end of the 
eighteenth century and, in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, became 
the predominant model of political organisation.13 According to Habermas, »the nation 
state and democracy were twins born of the French Revolution. From the cultural point 
of view, they exist in the shadow of nationalism.«14 It was the context of these events that 
gave rise to new forms of collective identity which furthered the republican idea of an 
ethnic, cultural and political solidary community, i. e. the nation, and equated it with the 
political self-determination of a nation within a given territory. From its starting point in 
France, the classic territorial state developed into the territorially anchored democratic 
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The national territory is being understood as a space that is enclosed by the borders of 
other states, over which the state exercises its territorial sovereignty, and for which it has 
achieved the recognition of its »monopoly on legitimate physical violence« (Max Weber). 
Borders in the sense of international law separate sovereign territories and »demarcate« 
the extent of state sovereignty. Hartshorne characterises borders generally as »that line 
which is to be accepted by all concerned as bounding the area in which everything is 
under jurisdiction of one state as against areas under different jurisdiction«.16 In addi-
tion to this political-legal concept of borders, it is also possible to emphasise the stra-
tegic and procedural character of spatial control. Thus Sack understands territoriality 
as »spatial strategy to affect, influence, or control resources and people, by controlling 
area.«17 Borders can therefore be seen as institutions of control aiming at the regulation 
of transboundary processes.18 
During their formative period, states have made great efforts to establish their capacity to 
take action through control of their territory. To achieve this objective, central strategic 
resources and the population were brought under unified control and then defended 
against external influences.19 Sovereign territory within fortified borders in turn made 
it possible to ensure security and protection for the population living on this territory.20 
Herz resumes the central physical and integrative capacities of the state »as an expanse of 
territory encircled for its identification and its defence by a ›hard shell‹ of fortifications. In 
this lies what will here be referred to as the ›impermeability‹, or ›interpenetrability‹, or 
simply the ›territoriality‹ of the modern state. The fact that it was surrounded by a hard 
C.	Tilly,	The	formation	of	national	states	(note	7);	M.	Zürn,	›Positives	Regieren‹	jenseits	des	Nationalstaates	(note	
9).	Here,	we	can	distinguish	between	the	model	of	a	liberal-democratic	nation	state	(typically	represented	by	
the	USA	during	Woodrow	Wilson’s	presidency)	and	 its	 republican	counterpart	 (see	M.	Zürn,	The	State	 in	the	
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shell rendered it to some extent secure from foreign penetration, and thus made it an 
ultimate unit of protection for those within boundaries.«21
National borders enclose a specific territory and allow for the surveillance and regulation 
of cross-border transactions and exchange. Differentiated border control – the decision 
as to which persons and goods may cross the borders of a nation state – is the central 
condition for the internal configuration of political resources, whether these concern 
legitimacy, fiscal politics, administration, or identity politics. In view of making claims 
on persons and their spatial mobility, states pursue the objective to bring under control 
and thus »anchor« in space a territory and the population living on it.22 Torpey thus 
contends that »in order to extract resources and implement policies, states must be in a 
position to locate and lay claim to people and goods. (...) I believe we would do well to 
regard states as seeking not simply to penetrate but also to embrace societies, ›surround-
ing‹ and ›taking hold‹ of them – individually and collectively – as those states grow larger 
and more administratively adept. More than this, states must embrace societies in order 
to penetrate them effectively. Individuals who remain beyond the embrace of the state 
necessarily represent limits on its penetration. The reach of the state, in other words, 
cannot exceed its grasp.«23 According to this view, it is impossible to establish political 
order without the collectivisation of territories and the population living on them.24 It 
is only within clearly demarcated territorial entities that nation states have been able to 
concentrate political authority, to create a nation and to transform the national territory 
into the primary focus of economic, political and religious life. Furthermore, during 
their formative period, states have attempted to use border controls as a means to control 
the centrifugal forces resulting from social, ethnic, political and religious cleavages. In 
addition, they compete with other states or subnational entities within their borders, 
against which they have to affirm their sovereign claims.25 
Consequently, the formation of the state was accompanied by a take-over or monopo-
lisation of border functions. Whereas restrictions on personal mobility had earlier been 
imposed by a wide range of social, religious or political organisations, Western states 
have suppressed these barriers and have monopolised control functions, thus depriving 
2	 J.H.	Herz,	Rise	and	Demise	of	the	Territorial	State	(note	7),	p.	474.
22	 The	literature	cited	below	shows	that	border	conflicts	are	empirically	the	most	frequent	reason	for	armed	con-
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regional powers, corporate bodies, religious organisations, and non-state political entities 
of their hold over the »legitimate means of movement«. John Torpey even affirms that 
the appropriation of control over the movement of persons through border controls, 
passport and visa systems has led to a fundamental transformation of the social order, no 
less important than the monopolisation of the means of production by a class of capi-
talists, described by Marx, and the creation of a state monopoly on violence, described 
by Weber: »To these two, we must add a third type of ›expropriation‹ in order to make 
sense of the modern world – the monopolization of the legitimate means of movement 
by modern states and the international state system more broadly. While hardly seamless, 
this monopolization has been extremely successful in regulating population movements 
and sorting out who belongs where.«26 
Furthermore, a closer look at the function of state control over cross-border movements 
of people makes it possible to distinguish two essential aspects. Firstly, border controls 
permit to regulate the mobility of persons living on the state‹s own territory, thus al-
lowing the state to control and make use of central resources. Citizens are registered 
through systems of identification with the aim of regulating and controlling their mobil-
ity across national borders. Identification and control not only allow for the imposition 
of conscription, thus ensuring the defence, security and protection of the state and of its 
citizens, but also for the levy of taxes. These in turn guarantee the financial fundament 
of the state and its capacity to take action.27 In addition, border controls allow control-
ling the access to social rights and privileges, thus ensuring the inclusion of the citizens 
into the state. Even in the fight against crime and threats to the public order caused by 
individuals, the personalised and standardised documentation, identification and con-
trol of the population plays a crucial role.28 Secondly, identity checks at the border are 
useful for preventing unwanted persons from »outside« who might constitute a threat to 
the security of the citizens, from entering the territory. Among these unwanted persons 
are potentially violent demonstrators, criminals, hooligans, terrorists, persons seeking 
political asylum, and persons who have already been rejected, illegal immigrants as well 
as labour migrants.29 Border controls also aim at refusing certain categories of foreigners 













29	 See	 P.	 Andreas	/	T.	 Snyder	 (eds),	The	Wall	 around	 the	West:	 State	 Borders	 and	 Immigration	 Controls	 in	 North	
America	and	Europe,	Lanham,	MD	2000.
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which are generally limited to citizens and foreign legal residents, whereas non-citizens 
are excluded, among others, through border controls. Furthermore, states seal off their 
territory against labour migration, goods, and services with the aim to protect their la-
bour markets and businesses against foreign competitors.
Control over personal mobility thus establishes a link between territorial borders and 
membership boundaries.30 While territorial borders allow for the control of physical 
movements and thus of entry to or exit from a national territory, membership bounda-
ries regulate access to certain social subsystems and services, such as education, social 
transfers and the labour market. While states are generally able to regulate inclusion into 
these systems, they are not in complete control of this process. Thus, on the one hand, 
access to the mechanisms of inclusion into (labour) markets and other social systems is 
limited;31 on the other hand, the universalisation of legal rights and principles of non-
discrimination and participation is imposing restrictions on state action, which do not 
allow for the complete exclusion of persons staying on the national territory.32 Entry 
and exit controls along the borders therefore play a central role in the »protection« and 
demarcation of membership spaces.33 Here Wimmer suggests that »the formation of 
societies constituted as nation states should be seen as a dialectic process where internal 
integration through extended rights for citizens and social exclusion of foreigners mutu-
ally reinforce themselves. In the final phase of this process of exclusion, even access to the 
national territory is subject to strict control.«34
3. Consequences of globalisation for territorial borders
The analytical model of the nation state as a closed and self-sufficient entity has increas-
ingly been criticised since the early 1970s. A growing number of authors argue that 
global and international exchange and networks have led to an erosion of the »container« 
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tal, goods, and services, as well as growing interdependencies between the states in the 
context of globalisation are generally being interpreted as indicators of the changing 
role of borders within the framework of the nation state. This leads to the question as 
to whether the classic model of the state with its corollary hypothesis of the important 
function of territorial control through borders can survive as an unquestioned analytical 
given within the social sciences.36
In the course of these debates, it has been claimed that state borders have increasingly lost 
importance and no longer play a decisive role in structuring social, political and econom-
ic transactions. Various authors are talking of »vanishing borders«37 and a »borderless« 
or »seamless world«38, thereby implying a loss of the function of national borders. Pro-
ponents of this thesis assume that the primacy of the global economy will transform 
states – and together with them national borders – into lesser subjects of transnational-
ism. According to them, the politically intended intensification of international trade 
and of interdependencies between national economies, as well as the ongoing differentia-
tion of the division of labour between productive locations will transform national bor-
ders and the barriers they impose on mobility into anachronisms.39 In the long run, this 
development would lead to the dissolution of the nation state’s jurisdictional spaces and, 
finally, of the nation state itself.40 Since, in the course of this process, border functions are 
being partially transferred to larger or non-territorial political entities, this would affect 
the effects of borders on entry and exit controls of persons, and on the monitoring of 
the resident population.41 The trade-off between mobility and security would disappear 
in favour of hoped-for gains in public welfare from the global market-place and result 
in the suppression of identity checks at national borders. Security would no longer be 
conceived as a task primarily carried out by the nation state, but as a common task aim-




















A	Blueprint	 for	Survival,	New	York	982.	R.	Rosecrance	 (note	3,	pp.	89sqq),	 for	example,	argues	that	states	 in	
times	of	a	globalised	and	interdependent	economy	no	longer	dispute	wars	and	conflicts	over	territories	with	
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A variation of this thesis describes the future of the state with catchwords such as »Welt-
staat«, »global state« and »world society«.43 More pointedly, its proponents contend that 
supranational institutions and organisations will be reinforced, the state will be newly 
conceptualised, and the traditional nation state will become obsolete in the long run. Ac-
cording to Albrow, »[this] state is decentred, transcends national borders and is penetrat-
ing the daily routines of people through which it realises itself. In this way a global state 
is emerging parallel to the growth of a global society.«44 Consequently, persons would be 
integrated into a global civil society in which global citizenship replaces national citizen-
ship. Borders and territorial control, which constitute the state’s monopoly on violence, 
as well as forms of territorial exclusion and inclusion derived from the nation state, 
would thus lose importance.
By contrast, proponents favouring the thesis of a strong nation state observe a process of 
»rebordering«.45 This position makes two assumptions: on the one hand, nation states 
continue to be seen as the sole relevant actors within the anarchic international system; 
on the other hand, security constitutes the predominant issue of state actions.46 This 
means that nation states are reinforcing border controls and identity checks in response 
to growing international threats posed by other states – and by »informal violence« in 
particular –,47 and aim at making them more effective and more efficient.48 
Another position taken in this debate also stresses the continuous central importance of 
national borders but claims that the organisation of control is subject to fundamental 
changes.49 According to this view, states have remained central actors of a network of 
international organisations, regional federations, and transnational enterprises because, 
first, they provide the infrastructure of globalisation in the form of legal norms, public 
security, and welfare; secondly, processes of globalisation become material on national 
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territories; and, thirdly, national territories are little affected.50 However, proponents of 
this thesis also observe that border controls and identity checks are being carried out 
more selectively, for instance in the form of »smart borders«.51 The latter allow for dif-
ferentiated controls that distinguish between »high-risk« and »low-risk traffic«. Whereas 
borders are of very little importance to categories of persons considered as low risk, 
they become almost insurmountable obstacles for those persons classified as high risk. 
In the face of threats stemming, for example, from terrorism, organised crime, and il-
legal migration, border controls and identity checks are implemented in such a way that 
they simultaneously comply with criteria of permeability and selective differentiation 
for various categories of persons.52 In this scenario, it is possible to control borders in 
an increasingly tight cooperation with other states, or partly even via private actors, or 
to shift them towards macro-territorial boundaries. While this thesis, too, suggests a 
concomitant possible loss of the state’s control capacity – as it refrains from exercising 
its monopoly on control with regard to certain categories of persons in view of realising 
welfare gains53 – states would nonetheless retain the capability to resume or reinforce 
border controls and identity checks in times of crisis.54 
Even assuming the emergence of functional equivalents, borders would have a different 
but still central significance. Schroer thus argues against the thesis that borders will be-
come obsolete: »The theoreticians of deterritorialisation and the enthusiasts of globalisa-
tion stop with the news that borders are disappearing. They forget that wherever a border 
is disappearing another one is being created elsewhere. Even borders seem to be subject 
to the laws of entropy. Borders do not disappear but shift their location and change their 
shape, disappear from one place only to reappear in another, change from clearly visible 
borders into less distinct invisible ones.«55 In the future, this would allow states or even 
non-political entities to increasingly differentiate between memberships and geographi-



















56	 D.J.	Elkins,	Beyond	Sovereignty,	Territory	and	Political	Economy	 in	 the	Twenty-First	Century,	Toronto	995;	U.	
Schimank,	Weltgesellschaft	und	Nationalgesellschaften	(note	6),	p.	4.
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non-members might be allowed easy access to the national territory while being kept out 
from the labour market, political participation or social transfers, all of them remaining 
limited to members. This differentiation might be implemented through greater efforts 
at control inside a country, whereas classic border controls would largely be abolished 
or delegated to larger entities in view of preventing large-scale migration between spaces 
characterised by socio-economic disparities. However, it is not yet possible to predict the 
inevitability of this process or the possible future obsolescence of differential controls at 
entry points to the national territory. In this sense Schimank notes: »As of today this the-
sis [of state borders as a necessity of world society] should be understood in the sense that 
national borders have been a functional necessity for the reproduction of world society, 
have existed at the most as marginal functional equivalents. It must remain open whether 
national borders might in future be replaced by other large-scale mechanisms.«57
The above theses should not be considered as mutually exclusive; they refer to similar 
empirical phenomena but extrapolate them differently within a particular conceptual 
and theoretical framework. However, as indicated by extracts from the ongoing debates, 
the container model of the nation state and the architecture of its territorial borders 
are subject to change pressures. Yet, the transformation of borders has hardly been in-
vestigated systematically up to now. The following part will attempt to give a summary 
account of the evolution in the cross-border movements of persons and then address the 
question as to how control is organised and implemented.
3.1. Developments in the mobility of persons
In the literature on globalisation, the increase in cross-border mobility and cross-border 
transactions is seen as a central indicator for greater global integration. While empirical 
indicators suggest major differences between the various forms of mobility and transac-
tions,58 it is often assumed that these must be seen as part of an »overall syndrome«, and 
that the trend toward less borders applies to the whole range of cross-border transactions 
and forms of mobility formerly regulated by the state. Starting with this assumption, 
the following paragraph will address the question as to what extent cross-border move-
ments of persons have changed in recent decades, and whether it will be possible to draw 
conclusions hinting at a modified control capacity of the state. Changes in the field of 
cross-border movements of persons must be seen against the background of the cross-
border mobility of other, mainly economic factors. The strong increase in international 
economic relations and of international networks since World War II goes back to the 





bericht	 der	 Enquete-Kommission,	 Globalisierung	 der	Weltwirtschaft,	 Opladen	 2002;	 D.	 Held	/	A.	 McGrew	/	D.	
Goldblatt	/	J.	Perraton,	Global	Transformation	(note	35);	P.	Legrain,	Open	World:	The	Truth	about	Globalization,	
Chicago	2002;	R.	Rode,	Weltregieren	durch	internationale	Wirtschaftsorganisationen,	Münster	2002;	 idem,	 In-
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strong push towards economic integration and towards the internationalisation of mar-
kets, though largely limited to the prosperous OECD member states.60 As far as the 
mobility of central economic resources – such as knowledge and information, capital, 
goods, and services – is concerned, the last decades have seen an almost invariable open-
ing up of national markets and, as its corollary, a greater permeability of borders.61 Hirst 
and Thompson thus note: »Nation states […] have become the local authorities of the 
global system. They can no longer independently affect the level of economic activity or 
employment within their territories; rather, that is dictated by the choice of internation-
ally mobile capital.«62 At the same time, the increasing integration and internationalisa-
tion of trade and production is affecting other fields of cross-border exchange, including 
the way border controls are being implemented by the state.63 Considerably less control 
has been exercised by the various states with regard to resources including knowledge, 
capital, and goods; this can be explained as resulting from the greater mobility of these 
factors and the decentralised nature of integration.64 It remains, however, an open ques-
tion whether the decrease in border controls should be interpreted as a loss of the state’s 
control capacity or as an intended (and potentially reversible) change.
It is as yet unclear whether this loss or renunciation of control applies to the cross-border 
movements of persons.65 Indeed, the number of border crossings has considerably in-
creased in recent decades, though significant variations as to the various forms of mobil-
ity are evident.66 With regard to the mobility of persons, we can distinguish two major 
types of long-term and short-term mobility by taking into account the duration of the 
stay and its motives. In the field of long-term mobility, migration plays a crucial role and 
has strongly increased in absolute terms over the last decades. While the number of mi-
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2000, or about 3% of the world’s total population.67 OECD member states are absorb-
ing roughly two-thirds of all migrants; it has also been noted that migratory flows and 
motives for migration tend to diversify on a global scale.68
Quantitatively speaking, the most significant form of migration is family migration, i. e. 
family members joining labour migrants.69 Because of a growing number of legal norms 
regulating this form of migration, it is estimated that states are left with little freedom of 
action in this matter.70 However, they may fix certain criteria (such as the age of family 
members or the definition of who qualifies as a family member). It should be noted that 
a number of the leading industrialised nations have not yet ratified the UN convention 
on migrants and their family members.71
With regard to international labour migration, we can distinguish several cycles since the 
1950s. Nayyar has identified two major phases since World War II.72 The first twenty-
five years have been characterised by a strong increase in numbers, the second phase by 
a general halt of migration in Europe, which was accompanied by the introduction of 
wide-ranging restrictions and regulations for migration candidates. By contrast, labour 
migration within the European Union is politically intended and being promoted, albeit 
with comparatively few results.73
The numbers of asylum seekers and refugees have shown a strong increase during the 1980s 
and 1990s: while about 30,000 applications for political asylum were annually registered 
in the industrialised states during the early 1970s,74 their number grew to 110,000 in 
1983, and to 892,000 in 1992.75 According to the UNHCR, the worldwide number of 
refugees grew from roughly 2.5 million in 1975 to 18.2 million in 1993. Since 2000, the 
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in OECD member states has dropped sharply.76 In Europe, this trend can be explained 
by the fact that entry into EU member countries is no longer possible via so-called »se-
cure third-party states« because asylum seekers and refugees are supposed to be already 
safe from prosecution in these transit countries.77 This has lead to huge numbers of 
migrants in the EU’s neighbouring states, who are awaiting entry into the country of 
their final destination or who are attempting to illegally enter the EU.78 In addition, the 
qualification of countries of origin as safe or unsafe has generally shifted at the expense 
of the applicants’ interests.79 
While there are no reliable numbers with regard to the evolution of illegal migration, 
researchers in principle agree on its increase. In Europe, illegal migrants are estimated 
to number some 5 million in addition to roughly 56 million legal migrants, with an 
annual increase of 500,000 persons.80 Estimations for the United States indicate 8.5 
million illegal migrants in addition to the 35 million legal migrants.81 One indicator for 
the growing number of illegal migrants is the evolution in the number of so-called »visa 
overstayers«, i. e. persons who enter the country with a tourist visa but do not leave after 
its expiration and therefore continue to stay on illegally.82 Similarly, the regularisation 
procedures implemented in various countries can to some extent provide data about the 
growing numbers of illegal migrants. Their repeated implementation suggests a strong 
flow of illegal migrants toward the countries that are implementing them, although these 
procedures affect only part of these migrants.
In addition to the already mentioned forms of long-term migration, there is short-term 
migration, such as tourism, student migration, and temporary labour migration. Gener-
ally, these forms are economically beneficial for the destination countries and are there-
fore being promoted by the state. Thus, highly qualified migrants, those with a contract 
for work and labour, as well as seasonal labour migrants have been excluded from the 
general prohibition of labour migration that is being practised in many industrialised 
countries. Among the European countries that explicitly favour the immigration of high-
76	 UNHCR,	Asylum	Levels	and	Trends	in	Industrialized	Countries,	2006,	Geneva	2007,	pp.	3sq.
77	 The	only	possibility	of	direct	entry	 is	by	air.	A	number	of	OECD	member	countries	have	consequently	 intro-
duced	the	so-called	»airport	procedure«	(Europäische	Kommission	gegen	Rassismus	und	Intoleranz,	Zweiter	
Bericht	 über	 Deutschland,	 p.	32,	 <www.coe.int/T/e/human_rights/ecri/5-Archives/-ECRI‘s_work/5-CBC_Se-
cond_reports-German%20version.pdf	>,	 last	access	7	January	2006).	This	procedure,	which	 is	based	on	the	
detention	of	candidates	for	asylum	in	the	transit	area	of	an	airport	until	the	final	decision	on	their	application	
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ly qualified people are France, Great Britain, Ireland, and –, since the introduction of a 
green card in 2000 – Germany. The United States have, however, remained the country 
with the highest rate of labour permits for highly qualified migrants.83 Seasonal migrants 
and those with a contract for work and labour are generally among those with little or no 
professional qualifications. All these forms of migration have seen a steady increase, even 
during less favourable economic periods: In selected EU countries, the respective annual 
growth rates for 2001 have reached 50% (Great Britain and Ireland), 37% (France) and 
24% (Germany). But strong variations occur as states define quotas according to their 
economic needs.84
An increase can also be observed for other forms of temporary migration, and for stu-
dent migration in particular.85 According to statistical data from the OECD, 1,522,700 
foreign students were residing in OECD countries in 2000,86 with most of them in the 
United States (slightly more than one third of the total numbers). The number of for-
eign students in the United States reached 366,000 in the late 1980s87 and has grown to 
475,000 in 2000.88 
Tourism is another form of temporary migration promoted by many states because of its 
economic benefits. It is estimated that some 11 to 15% of the gross national product in 
North America and the European Union derives from the tourist sector.89 Worldwide 
numbers have risen from 25 million in 1950 to more than 635 million arrivals in 1998, 
increasing by a factor of 25; OECD countries are at present the most popular destination 
countries.90 In 2004, 9.8% of the worldwide travel went to France, 7% to Spain, and 
6% to the United States.91 Several OECD member countries only provide data about 
the number of arrivals, which do not allow for a distinction between the various motives 
for travelling. Where data are available, it can be observed that all kinds of travel have 
increased during the last fifteen years.92 Business travel has shown a particularly strong 
increase, with an average annual growth rate of 6.4%, whereas tourist travel has increased 
on average by 3.9% per year. Furthermore, travel abroad has increased with respect to 
all forms of travel within many OECD member countries. This is particularly true for 
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Overall, the number of cross-border movements of persons has shown a greater variety 
than it has been the case with the above-mentioned economic factors. Whereas the latter 
generally register a strong increase in cross-border transactions (with the exception of 
services), the movements of persons are characterised by a contradictory evolution. On 
the one hand, forms of mobility that provide economic benefits are being promoted and 
have led to a significant increase in the number of border crossings during the last decades, 
with tourists, highly qualified persons, seasonal migrants, those with a contract for work 
and labour, as well as students being among the economically »desirable« categories of 
persons. In addition, migration has been facilitated in a number of ways between OECD 
member countries or within the context of supranational communities such as the EU.94 
On the other hand, the number of border crossings thought to provide no economic 
benefits or to constitute a security risk has dropped. Chiswick and Hatton argue that the 
restrictive migration policies of OECD member countries are a major obstacle to world-
wide migration toward economically prosperous countries.95 The importance of security-
related considerations with regard to cross-border movements of persons has become 
evident, in particular, against the background of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 
2001. Persons who, because of their personal or structural characteristics, are suspected 
of being a security risk have been experiencing strong restrictions on their entry to the 
concerned states.96 When comparing these contradictory trends, it becomes evident that 
the state continues to play an important role with respect to the cross-border movements 
of persons. It does so by differentiating between categories of desirable and undesirable 
persons and by implementing measures to facilitate or to restrict movements. Although 
the number of border crossings has increased in many fields, the entry and residence of 
persons are still subject to state regulation. Here, it is possible to observe a simultaneous 
opening up and closing that suggests a specialisation and diversification of borders and 
spaces.97 Border controls have been adapted to specific categories of persons: for certain 
people their function as a barrier has almost disappeared, while other persons are still 
forced to accept severe restrictions on their movements.
3.2 The internationalisation of borders and their technological transformation
Ultimately, the transformation of borders, the form they take, and the state’s capacity 
to control them cannot, as often implicitly suggested in the debate about globalisation, 
be explained on the basis of increasing numbers of cross-border transactions and cross-
border movements of persons only. Indeed, the actual transformation of borders, as well 
as the state’s capacity to control them can only be understood within the framework of 
94	 Tourists	from	OECD	member	countries	do	no	longer	experience	significant	barriers	during	cross-border	move-
ments	thanks	to	greater	facilities	in	obtaining	visas	or	gaining	entry.
95	 B.R.	Chiswick	/	T.J.	Hatton,	 International	Migration	and	the	 Integration	of	Labor	Markets,	 IZA	Discussion	Paper	
559,	Bonn	2002.
96	 H.	Pellerin,	Migration	and	Border	Controls	 in	the	EU:	Economic	and	Security	Factors,	 in:	J.	DeBardeleben	(ed),	
Managing	the	Divide	in	an	Enlarged	Europe,	Aldershot	2005,	pp.	05-22.
97	 See	M.	Schroer,	Räume,	Orte,	Grenzen	(note	55),	p.	233.
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an integrated approach that includes border control regimes. The quantitative evolution 
of cross-border movements should therefore be interpreted as an indicator of the state’s 
control, or the (selective) permeability of a specific border, and not as a loss of the state’s 
control capacity or as the simple dismantling of borders.
Progressive globalisation and its corollary, the increased mobility of resources and per-
sons, raise the question of how states react to the increasing number of border crossings 
in terms of control. Within this context, two trends can be observed, which can be 
subsumed by the keywords of »internationalisation« and »technological change«. With 
respect to the former, there appears to have occurred a fundamental change in the way 
states are using their frontiers: While formerly, border control was an exclusively sover-
eign task, it is now increasingly being organised as a bilateral or multilateral affair. Border 
agreements and treaties, cooperation in the fields of border security and information ex-
change, as well as between security agencies, shared criteria for visas and entry, and com-
mon databanks are among the major elements of this development.98 However, there 
are great variations as to the kind, degree, and form of cooperation.99 The latter ranges 
from common information systems for border controls and identity checks, shared law 
enforcement on drug trafficking and controls of immigrants to the development of a 
common infrastructure for border controls and border security. Another evolution with 
regard to internationalisation concerns the shift of border controls toward the supra-
national, or macro-territorial, level. Central characteristic of this process are the de-in-
stitutionalisation of international borders and a trend toward the growing importance 
of the external boundaries of a territory comprising several nation states, in which the 
control and protective function of the border is increasingly being administered through 
cooperation between several countries.100 This has resulted in the evolution of larger 
geographical-territorial areas with partially homogeneous standards for border regimes, 
border security and border controls, which ensure greater internal permeability, whereas 
border control functions are shifted toward the external boundaries and thus operate as 
»macro-regional borders«.101 The best example of this evolution is the European Un-
ion.102 Within the EU, an economically, legally and socially unified area is contributing 
		98	 See	J.	Anderson	/	L.	O’Dowd	/	T.M.	Wilson,	New	Borders	for	a	Changing	Europe:	Cross-Border	Cooperation	and	
Governance,	London	and	Portland	2003;	A.	Church	/	P.	Reid,	Cross-Border	Co-operation,	Institutionalization	and	
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to reduce the importance of borders between member states and has allowed the free 
movement of goods, services, capital, and persons.103 The external boundaries are subject 
to unified standards and assume control and protective functions for the entire territory. 
Other examples of macro-territorialisation are the Nordic Passport Union of Scandinavia 
and, to a much lesser extent, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the 
Asian Pacific Economic Community (APEC) and the South American Mercosur. With 
regard to the EU, Lahav argues that border cooperation and the concomitant shift of 
controls toward the external boundaries do not result in a loss of control for the con-
cerned states but rather reinforce the efficiency of border controls.104
The second central development trend concerns the technological transformation of 
borders and border controls, which is accompanied by operational changes in bor-
der regimes, with both factors mutually depending on each other.105 In this context, 
Kaufmann mentions several concomitant evolutions conceptualised as changes in border 
topography and identified as the forward-shifting, intensification and inversion of the 
border.106 The concept of forward-shifting refers to attempts that aim to ensure the de-
fence against persons and events who or which constitute a potential security risk for the 
destination country even beyond the border. Partly, these efforts aim at preventing »un-
desirable« persons (i. e. those considered a risk) to reach the physical frontier: transport 
companies, for example, are under obligation to refuse persons without a valid visa for 
the destination country.107 Other instruments of border forward-shifting are the trans-
mission of personal data by transport companies,108 advanced warning systems, and of-
ficials delegated to other countries in order to carry out monitoring tasks. These attempts 
are being implemented through new technologies of data recording and transmission 
which have created a »border beyond the border«.109 Another aspect of this evolution 





















09	 C.	 Boswell,	The	 External	 Dimension	 of	 EU	 Immigration	 and	 Asylum	 Policy,	 in:	 International	 Affairs	 79,	 2003,	
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is the increasing confusion between military and police tasks since terrorism, organised 
crime and illegal migration are being perceived as a single problem, and controls by the 
police and the armed forces therefore concern a »single« threat.110 The intensification of 
borders is based on the transformation of isolated border controls into the large-scale 
surveillance of border regions. Thus, the use of video and radar technologies allows for 
the automated surveillance and registration of large categories of persons and vast spaces, 
that is without taking into account the specific characteristics of a person.111 At the 
same time, control procedures focus on unique physical characteristics of the controlled 
person and no longer rely on identity papers held by them. Use is, for example, being 
made of new passport systems that now include biometric data and of interconnected 
electronic databanks for identification.112 Finally, the concept of inversion refers to the 
spreading of identity checks without probable cause to the national territory, away from 
the border. Here, too, techniques of objectified control such as video surveillance and 
dragnet investigations are being combined with control instruments based on external 
personal characteristics. Inversion is mainly distinguished from intensification in that 
it separates control from the border space in its strict sense and is directed at a much 
larger category of persons. All three developments – forward-shifting, intensification 
and inversion – show that the notion of a linear boundary has disappeared in favour of a 
conception of the border as a flexible space, with technological change playing a central 
role. The internationalisation as well as changes at the operative level of border regimes 
do not suggest a loss of the importance of borders but rather indicate a transformation 
of their shape and form.
4. Conclusions
In the course of globalisation, the nation state and its territorial border controls have 
been subject to strong and continuous pressures to change. The increase in cross-border 
movements of resources and persons, in particular, has lead to a modified general frame-
work to which states need to adapt. The empirical literature on the subject suggests a 
large increase in such cross-border movements. However, the quantitative evolution of 
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ticularly, to the various categories of persons and their motives for entry. How do states 
react to this new challenge? Do states, their territorial sovereignty and their control over 
»legitimate means of movement« remain fundamentally unchanged, only adapting bor-
der regimes to the new situation? Or do states react with the traditional instruments of 
extended and intensified controls at the borders and of movements, reinforced through 
new systems and technologies of internal security?
Existing research on the subject does not allow a final answer to these questions. None 
of the above-mentioned scenarios can claim to provide a complete and plausible de-
scription of the ongoing developments. Our preliminary results suggest that states react 
to the new challenges in a more complex and more differentiated way than has often 
been argued. It is not possible to detect an unequivocal trend toward the dismantling of 
borders and their increased permeability, rather a simultaneous opening up and closing. 
States attempt to transform borders into a kind of semi-permeable filters that allow for 
selective and differentiated controls of different categories of persons in order to recon-
cile defence and security, on the one hand, and economic imperatives, on the other. To 
ensure this aim, they rely not only on new technologies, methods and integrated ap-
proaches of external and internal security but also on concepts of border control and bor-
der security developed through international cooperation at a bilateral or supranational 
level. A clearly perceptible trend in this context is the dismantling of national borders 
and the shifting of control functions toward a supranational or macro-territorial level. 
Controls are hence carried out in common, probably with little losses of effectiveness 
and efficiency. Although the single nation state thus loses some of its control capacity, 
there is no overall loss of control. In addition, new technologies have enabled the state 
to implement more comprehensive controls at border crossing-points but also beyond 
and inside its territory. 
This leaves open the question as to what extent the described developments reflect more 
general trends. The above-mentioned empirical results are mainly based on case studies 
and cannot be generalised because of strong variations between the various states. As of 
now, there exists no comprehensive empirical investigation of the transformation of bor-
ders or the state’s capacity to carry out border controls and identity checks. Nonetheless, 
statements that postulate a general loss of the importance of borders seem excessive. All 
these questions need to be investigated empirically and in greater detail. Even greater 
are the research desiderata when it comes to describing the driving forces and central 
determinants behind the transformation of borders. Only answers to these questions will 
allow to finally elucidate the role of identity controls at borders within the context of an 
emerging post-national state.
